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CASE COMMENTS
REFUSAL To FUND CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
RIGHT HELD VALID
Harris v. McRae, 100 S.Ct. 2671 (1980)
In Harris v. McRaeI the United States Supreme Court limited the
ability of a woman to exercise her fundamental right to decide to termi-
nate a pregnancy 2 by upholding the constitutionality 3 of a congres-
sional act that severely restricts federal funding for abortions.
Since 1976, Congress has annually attached a rider to the appropria-
tions bil 4 for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.5 The
rider, commonly known as the Hyde amendment,6 prohibits the use of
federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid
program7 except in certain specified circumstances. Plaintiffs, an indi-
1. 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
2. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For cases raising constitutional issues related to
the right to abortion, see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379
(1979); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106
(1976); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Connecticut v. Menillo,
423 U.S. 9 (1975) (per curiam); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). See generally notes 22-67 infra
and accompanying text.
3. 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2693 (1980).
4. The version of the Hyde amendment for fiscal year 1980 provides:
[N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to perform abortions
except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest
when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or
public health service.
Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923 (1979).
This version of the amendment is broader than that passed in 1976 for fiscal year 1977. The
exception for "rape or incest" was not included in that amendment. Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90
Stat. 1434 (1976). The amendments for fiscal years 1978 and 1979 were broader, allowing pay-
ment for "instances where severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother would
result if the pregnancy were carried to term when so determined by two physicians." Pub. L. No.
95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977); Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1586 (1978). The Harris
Court used the term "Hyde amendment" to refer generally to all three versions of the amendment.
100 S. Ct. at 2681 n.4. This case comment will do the same.
5. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was recently renamed the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (Supp. III 1979). The Harris opinion
retained the old title for clarity. 100 S. Ct. at 2680 n.2. This case comment will do the same.
6. 100 S. Ct. at 2680.
7. Congress instituted the Medicaid program in 1965 to provide financial assistance to states
that fund medical services for needy persons. State participation in the program is optional; coin-
Washington University Open Scholarship
248 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:247
gent woman who wished to terminate a pregnancy while in the first
trimester and an association of hospitals that provide abortion serv-
ices, 8 brought suit in district court to challenge the Hyde amendment's
constitutionality. The district court issued a preliminary injunction
against the implementation of the funding restrictions.9
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court' ° vacated the injunction and
remanded the case to the district court" for reconsideration in light of
the Court's decisions in Maher v. Roe 12 and Beal v. Doe.13 On remand,
the district court permitted additional plaintiffs to intervene'4 and file
pliance with federal requirements is mandatory for all participants. The program lists five general
categories of medical treatments that are to be funded under a state assistance plan. A state is not
required to fund all medical treatment under all five categories. The standard for determining the
proper extent of assistance is that the state plan must be reasonable and consistent with the objec-
tives of the federal program. The purpose of the program is to enable states to provide medical
assistance to those persons whose income is insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical
services. 100 S. Ct. at 2680. See generally Social Security Act, Title XIX, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976
and Supp. 11 1978).
8. The district court certified the case as "a class action... on behalf of the class of preg-
nant or potentially pregnant Medicaid-eligible women in the state of New York, who, in consulta-
tion with their physicians, decide within twenty-four weeks after the commencement of
pregnancy, to terminate their pregnancies by abortion" and "as a class action. . . on behalf of the
class of duly licensed and Medicaid-certified providers of abortional services to Medicaid-eligible
pregnant women." McRae v. Matthews, 421 F. Supp. 533, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
9. Judge Dooling granted the preliminary injunction reasoning that the Hyde amendment
was unconstitutional. "When the power of enactment is used to compel submission to a rule of
private conduct not expressive of norms of conduct shared by the society as a whole without
substantial division it fails as law and inures as oppression." McRae v. Matthews, 421 F. Supp.
533, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
10. The Supreme Court has immediate appellate jurisdiction from any civil action, suit, or
proceeding, or proceeding to which he United States or its agents is a party, that holds an Act of
Congress unconstitutional. 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976). See Brief for Petitioner at 2, Harris v. Mc-
Rae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
I1. Califano v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1977) (mem.).
12. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
13. 432 U.S. 438 (1977). The Supreme Court decided Maher and Beal after the district court
granted the preliminary injunction against the implementation of the Hyde amendment. See
notes 56-67 infra and accompanying text.
14. The district court "permitted the intervention of several additional plaintiffs, including
(I) four individual Medicaid recipients who wished to have abortions that allegedly were medi-
cally necessary but did not qualify for federal funds under the versions of the Hyde amendment
applicable in fiscal years 1977 and 1978, (2) several physicians who perform abortions for Medi-
caid recipients, (3) the Women's Division of the Board of Global Ministries of the United Meth-
odist Church (Women's Division), and (4) two individual officers of the Women's Division." 100
S. Ct. at 2681. The district court also recertified the case as a class action. This second certifica-
tion "included all pregnant women regardless of the stage of their pregnancy" who wished to
abort their pregnancy because of medical necessity. Id. at 2682 n.10.
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an amended complaint. 5 In the complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the
Medicaid statute requires a state to fund medically necessary abor-
tions 6 and that the Hyde amendment is unconstitutional. 7 After dis-
posing of the statutory issue,18 the district court invalidated the Hyde
amendment 9 and ordered the continued expenditure of federal funds
for medically necessary abortions.2" On appeal, the Supreme Court re-
versed and held: The Hyde amendment in its refusal to fund a consti-
tutionally protected activity does not violate the fifth amendment.2'
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution22 protects cit-
15. Id. at 2682. The district court opinion remains unreported.
16. The complaint alleged that the Hyde amendment did not change a state's funding obliga-
tions under the Medicaid act. Regardless of the federal matching funds available, each state was
required to fund all medically necessary abortions because it participated in the Medicaid pro-
gram. Id.
17. Plaintiffs argued that the Hyde amendment unconstitutionally violated the free exercise
and establishment clauses of the first amendment and the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. Id. See note 74 infra.
18. The district court described the Hyde amendment as a substantive amendment of Title
XIX, the Medicaid act. Even though it was a rider to an appropriations bill, it effectively
amended the substantive law. See, e.g., Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 134 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979), appeal dismnissed, 100 S. Ct. 3039 (1980). Women's Health Servs., Inc.
v. Maher, 482 F. Supp. 725, 728 (D. Conn. 1980). But see Doe v. Busbee, 481 F. Supp. 46, 50
(N.D. Ga. 1979) (citing Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 1979)) (Hyde amend-
ment did not substantively alter a state's funding obligation under Title XIX); Doe v. Mathews,
420 F. Supp. 865, 869 (D.N.J. 1976) (Hyde amendment did not affect or amend Title XIX). See
generally TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978) (an appropriations act without clear and manifest
intention to repeal does not repeal prior legislation by implication unless statutes "irreconcila-
ble"); Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. National Mines Corp., 554 F.2d 1267, 1275
(4th Cir. 1977) (an appropriations act can be accorded significant weight in determining intent of
earlier legislation and could be considered a substantive amendment).
19. The district court found that the Hyde amendment violated the equal protection compo-
nent of the fifth amendment's due process clause because the decision to fund medically necessary
services but only certain medically necessary abortions served no legitimate purpose. The court
also held that the Hyde amendment violated the free exercise clause of the first amendment be-
cause a woman's decision to seek a medically necessary abortion may be produced by her reli-
gious beliefs. The court found no violation of the first amendment's establishment clause. 100 S.
Ct. at 2682.
20. Id.
21. The Supreme Court also held that states are under no obligation to fund where the fed-
eral and state governments are cooperating in the administration of a program to accomplish a
particular purpose such as the Medicaid program and the federal government withdraws funding.
Id. at 2685. In addition, the Court held that the Hyde amendment does not contravene the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment by coinciding with the religious tenets of the Roman Cath-
olic Church and that none of the plaintiffs have standing to raise a free exercise challenge. Id. at
2684, 2689-90.
22. U.S. CONsT. amend. V provides in relevant part: "No person shall be. . . deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
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izens from deprivation of any fundamental right 23 related to "life, lib-
erty, or property" without due process of law. Implicit in this due
process guarantee is the principle of equal protection under the law, 24
which is similar to the guarantee of equal protection found in the four-
teenth amendment .2  The guarantee of equal protection also protects
people from governmental action that impinges on a fundamental
right.26 The Supreme Court has held various rights fundamental and
protected. By labelling a right fundamental the Court subjects any
governmental impingement of that right to close scrutiny.2 8
23. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (Cardozo, J.). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 572-75 (1978). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (fundamental right pro-
tected by fourteenth amendment).
24. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 94 n.1 (1979). See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 272, 800, 992 (1978); Karst, The Fifth Amend-
ment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REV. 541 (1977).
25. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (per curiam); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498,
505-06 (1975). But see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction of
equal protection of the laws."
26. One form of equal protection analysis involves a judicial examination of the legislation to
determine whether it impinges on a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of some
suspect class. If the legislation impinges on fundamental rights, the legislative purpose must be
compelling and the legislation must be related closely to that purpose. If the legislation does not
impinge on fundamental rights, the legislation only need rationally relate to a legitimate legisla-
tive purpose. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). Accord, Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312
(1976). But see San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (sliding scale of scrutiny); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1972)
(effort to formulate a single standard of review); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26
(1961) (law will be upheld if any reasonable set of facts support it). See generally Gunther, Fore-
word- In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A4 Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972); Michelman, Foreword- On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1970); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protec-
tion, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
27. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (right to adversary
hearing either prior to or immediately following a prejudgment garnishment); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (right to decide to terminate a pregnancy); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254
(1969) (right of welfare recipient to evidentiary hearing prior to benefit termination); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married persons to obtain contraceptives); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right of defendant in noncapital felony case to counsel); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
28. The Court has recognized that, "[w]here certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the
Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state
interest.'" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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One fundamental right is the right of privacy.29 Authority for consti-
tutional protection of the right of privacy emanates from the penum-
bral nature of specified constitutional rights that encompass basic
notions of liberty and justice.3" Actions protected under the privacy
guarantee include childrearing,3' procreation,32 and private family ac-
tion.3 3
In Griswold v. Connecticut 34 the Supreme Court, in striking down a
state statute imposing criminal sanctions on the use of contraceptives,35
extended the right of privacy to encompass the right of married persons
to obtain contraceptives.36 The Court considered the right to obtain
contraceptives fundamental because of the societal importance of mari-
tal privacy. 37 The Connecticut statute impermissibly impinged on mar-
ital privacy because it forbade the use of contraceptives. 38
In Roe v. Wade39 the Supreme Court extended privacy protection to
encompass a woman's right to decide to terminate a pregnancy.40 The
Court in Roe invalidated portions of a Texas criminal statute proscrib-
ing any abortion that was not necessary to save the mother's life.41 The
29. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See generaly
Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charterfor an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64
MICH. L. REV. 197 (1965); Henkin, PrivacyandAutonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); Note,
Indigent Women andAborion: Limitation of the Right ofPrivacy in Maher v. Roe, 13 TULSA L.J.
287 (1977).
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1965) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-22 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); 381 U.S. at
493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)). Several consti-
tutional amendments have provided support for the right of privacy in one context or another.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (fourteenth amendment); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (same); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and
fourteenth amendments); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (first and
fourteenth amendments).
31. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923).
32. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541-42 (1942).
33. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
34. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
35. Id. at 480.
36. Id. at 485.
37. Id. at 486. See also id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
38. 381 U.S. at 485.
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Id. at 154.
41. Id. at 117-19, 164-65.
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right to decide to terminate a pregnancy is founded in the significant
privacy interests42 embodied in personal intimacy, including the possi-
ble distress resulting from an unwanted child.4 3
The Roe Court recognized two compelling governmental objectives
that justify impingement on the fundamental right to decide to
abort44-the protection of the life and health of the mother and the
protection of the potentiality of life. The governmental interest in pro-
tecting the health of the mother becomes compelling at the end of the
first trimester of pregnancy.45 Thus, a state may regulate the abortion
procedure after the end of the first trimester as long as the regulation
reasonably relates to the preservation of maternal health.46 Likewise,
the governmental interest in protecting the potentiality of life becomes
compelling when the fetus reaches viability.47 The state may regulate
abortions after viability48 and even proscribe abortion except when it is
necessary to preserve the mother's health.49
The Court has had several opportunities to clarify the scope of the
right to terminate a pregnancy.5" One decisive factor in several cases
addressing the abortion issue is the medical aspect of the decision to
abort.-5 The extent to which a statute presents an obstacle to the deci-
42. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Court recognized right of unmarried per-
sons to obtain and use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Court recog-
nized right of married persons to obtain and use contraceptives); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942) (Court protected prison inmate's right to procreate). Contra, Ely, The Wages fCrying
Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (suggesting lack of precedent and
legal foundation for right recognized in Roe); Morgan, Roe v. Wade andthe Lesson of the Pre- Roe
Case Law, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (1979) (same); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, Foreword-
Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Lffe and Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1973) (same).
43. 410 U.S. at 153.
44. Id. at 163.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The Roe Court declared viability important because at that point "the fetus then
presumably has the capability ofmeaningful life outside the mother's womb." 410 U.S. at 163
(emphasis added). Prior to Roe the Court examined various notions of when life begins and
concluded that the law made no value judgments on this issue. Id. at 160-62. The medical defini-
tion of viability is the capability of living, which "usually connotes a fetus that has reached 500
grams in weight and 20 gestational weeks." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 551 (3d unabr.
law. ed. 1976).
48. The Court listed examples of permissible state regulation-requirements concerning the
qualifications of persons who perform abortions, requirements concerning licensing, and require-
ments concerning the place where an abortion may take place. 410 U.S. at 163.
49. Id. at 163-64.
50. See, e.g., cases cited in note 2 supra.
51. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (determination of when viability oc-
[Vol. 59:247
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sion to abort is another factor. An absolute obstacle is automatically an
unconstitutional impingement. 2 The obstacle, however, need not be
absolute to be impermissible.5 3 The right to abort depends on the ex-
tent and nature of the state's interference with that right. 4 Finally, the
Court has upheld statutes that require different recordkeeping proce-
dures for abortions than for other medical services.
In the public funding context, the Court continued to uphold statu-
tory distinctions between abortions and other medical services.56 In
Maher v. Roe 57 the Supreme Court upheld a state regulation limiting
state Medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions to medically neces-
curs left to physician); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (physician's right to perform abor-
tions inextricably bound up with privacy rights of women who seek abortions); Connecticut v.
Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (per curiam) (right to abort encompasses right to clinical abortion
performed by medically competent personnel).
52. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). A state statute required
the consent of a spouse before a woman could obtain an abortion. This requirement could operate
as an absolute obstacle to a woman's choice to abort if her husband refused to consent. The state,
however, cannot delegate to a spouse veto power that the state itself cannot exercise. Therefore,
the Court held the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 67-72.
53. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-44 (1979) (statute requiring parental consent before a
minor may obtain an abortion unconstitutional because alternative procedure for proving the mi-
nor's maturity not provided); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687-91 (1977) (statute
prohibiting distribution of nonnedical contraceptives except through licensed pharmacists im-
posed significant burden on right of individual to choose to use contraceptives and thus unconsti-
tutional because no compelling interest served); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195-98 (1973)
(statute, interposing a hospital committee between the doctor and woman's abortion decision and
the actual abortion, substantially limits a woman's right to receive medical care according to her
physician's best judgment and, in absence of compelling interest, unconstitutional).
54. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (Roe right can only be understood by
considering both woman's interest and nature of state's interference with it); Bellotti v. Baird, 428
U.S. 132, 148-50 (1976) (constitutionality of any distinction between abortion and other medical
services depends on degree and justification for state's interference). See also Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (state interference allowed when termed an encouragement for alternative
choice).
55. See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79-81 (1976) (statute im-
posing recordkeeping requirements for abortions constitutional because procedures reasonably
related to preservation of maternal health).
56. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (Court upheld city owned public hospital's re-
fusal to perform nontherapeutic abortion even though it does handle pregnancies); Beal v. Doe,
432 U.S. 438 (1977) (Court interpreted the federal Social Security Act to allow a state choice to
withhold funds for nontherapeutic abortions when the state funded pregnancies and medically
necessary abortions). These cases, together with Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), are com-
monly referred to as the Abortion Funding Cases. See Appleton, 7he Abortion-Funding Cases and
Population Control: An Imaginary Lawsuit (Andsome Reflections on the Uncertain Limits of Repro-
ductive Privacy), 77 MICH. L. REv. 1688 (1979).
57. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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sary abortions. 8 The same state Medicaid program generally subsi-
dized the medical expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth.59
The Court characterized the state regulation as a policy choice that en-
courages alternatives to the constitutionally-protected abortion
choice.6° The state policy choice is permissible because the government
has discretion to distribute funds.61 The Maher Court held that the
state decision not to fund elective first trimester abortions did not create
an impermissible obstacle to a woman's decision to abort.62  Prior to
the development of a state policy to encourage childbirth through fund-
ing decisions,63 a woman's indigency restricted her ability to choose.64
The state Medicaid plan limiting benefits to medically necessary abor-
tions thus did not impinge on the fundamental right to decide to
abort.6
5
Following Maher, the lower federal courts disagreed on the proper
scope of constitutional protection for the right to decide to terminate a
pregnancy and the permissibility of severe restrictions on federal funds
for abortions. In light of the Supreme Court's apparent approval of
any legislative funding decision, some courts held that the Hyde
amendment, as a federal funding choice, was permissible.66 Other
58. Id. at 466, 480.
59. Id. at 468-69.
60. Id. at 474-76.
61. The Court's underlying premise appears to be that funding choices belong almost entirely
in the legislative realm. "The decision whether to expend state funds for nontherapeutic abortion
is fraught with judgments of policy and value over which opinions are sharply divided." Id. at
479.
The legislature is the governmental forum for decision between divided opinions. See K.
PREWITT & S. VERBA, PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 260 (1975). There is some disa-
greement, however, as to whether any governmental decision is appropriate. See Hardy, Privacy
andPublic Funding: Maher v. Roe as the Interaction of Roe v. Wade and Dandridge v. Williams,
18 ARIZ. L. REv. 903, 937 (1976), where the author argues, "In light of the comparative claims of
opposing groups, and the availability of private recourse, it seems rational for the government to
take a path of neutrality in the abortion funding decision."
62. 432 U.S. at 474. But see id at 483, 488-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 474-75.
64. Id.
65. Id But see id at 482 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the state funding
choice makes an indigent woman's access to medically competent physicians to obtain an abortion
impossible. An indigent then will feel as though there is no choice but to carry the pregnancy to
term, because the state will fund the pregnancy. The dissent found this practical consequence of
the funding regulation determinative in finding an impingement on the fundamental right to de-
cide to terminate a pregnancy. See also notes 91-96, 100-12 infra and accompanying text.
66. E.g., Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975); Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir.
1975); Frieman v. Walsh, 481 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Woe v. Califano, 460 F. Supp. 234
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courts relied on the Supreme Court's emphasis on medical considera-
tions and held the Hyde amendment unconstitutional because it denied
federal funds for most medically necessary abortions.67
In Harris v. McRae the Supreme Court found Maher v. Roe deci-
sive68 in determining that a federal refusal to fund medically necessary
abortions does not impinge on the fundamental right to decide to
abort.69 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, rejected the argument
that states must maintain Medicaid funding for medically necessary
abortions even though the Hyde amendment precludes the use of fed-
eral funds for medically necessary abortions.70 The Medicaid program
pools federal and state funds in a common purposive effort.7 The co-
operative scheme contemplates the participation of both parties. The
states therefore cannot be compelled to maintain funding when federal
funds have been withdrawn72 unless Congress evinces a contrary in-
tent.73
(S.D. Ohio 1978); D_ R_.. v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978), rev'd, 617 F.2d 203 (10th
Cir. 1980). See also Doe v. Mundy, 441 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (county refusal of funding).
67. E.g., Reproductive Health Servs. v. Freeman, 614 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1980); Preterm, Inc.
v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979); Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362
(4th Cir. 1978); Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974); Planned Parenthood Affiliates of
Ohio v. Rhodes, 477 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Jaffe v. Sharp, 463 F. Supp. 222 (D. Mass.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 165 N.J. Super. 443, 398 A.2d
587 (1979). See also Planned Parenthood v. Minnesota, 612 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1980) (state denial
of funding); Emma G. v. Edwards, 434 F. Supp. 1048 (E.D. La. 1978) (same).
68. 100 S. Ct. at 2686-89.
69. Id. at 2689. See notes 56-65 supra and accompanying test.
70. The Court first examined this statutory issue because if it decided the issue in favor of
appellees, i.e., required the states to fund medically necessary abortions, there would have been no
need to address the constitutional issues. Id. at 2680. Accord, Rescue Army v. Municipal Ct. of
Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947). This case delineates the policy justifications behind the
Supreme Court's general ban on advisory opinions. The ban dictates that the Court not adjudi-
cate a constitutional issue unless such decision is unavoidable. See also G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1535-44 (9th ed. 1975). In McRae appellees argued that
the Social Security Act required all states participating in the Medicaid program to fund medically
necessary abortions despite congressional withdrawal of funds for that purpose. Appellees
claimed that medical necessity was the statutory standard for determining what services to fund.
Because the statute did not contain language outlining federal duties, the appellees concluded that
a congressional withdrawal of funds did not change the state's obligation. See Brief for Appellees
at 112, Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
71. 100 S. Ct. at 2683.
72. Id. at 2684.
73. The Court cited with approval the determination by other federal courts that Congress
did not expect the states to maintain funding of the abortions for which the Hyde amendment
withdrew federal funds. Id. at 2685. The legislative history is replete with statements by members
of Congress expressing their belief that the states would and could withdraw Medicaid money
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After addressing several other constitutional issues,74 the majority
held that the Hyde amendment does not impinge on the fundamental
right to decide to terminate a pregnancy.75 Due process does not pre-
vent a legislature from using a funding allocation to encourage an al-
ternate activity over a constitutionally-protected activity. 76 Although a
woman's interests in her health and in her decision to abort are funda-
mental liberties, 77 the Constitution does not require the government to
fund abortions because the government did not create the obstacle that
effectively prohibits an indigent women from procuring an abortion.73
That obstacle is indigency.79 The due process clause does not guaran-
from abortion funding after the Hyde amendment was passed. E.g., 123 CONG. REC. H. 6085
(daily ed. June 17, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Bauman); id. at 6088 (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt); id. at
6092 (remarks of Rep. Holtzman); 123 CONG. REc. S. 18,583 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1977) (remarks of
Sen. Bayh); id. at 18,589 (remarks of Sen. Packwood).
74. Appellees argued several other constitutional issues that the Court rejected. Appellees
claimed that the Hyde amendment violated the establishment clause of the first amendment be-
cause it incorporated into the law the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church. I00 S. Ct. at 2689.
Those doctrines declare abortion a sin and determine the point in time at which life commences.
The Court used the three-prong test from Committee for Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Regan,
444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980), to find that the Hyde amendment did not contravene the establishment
clause. 100 S. Ct. at 2689. The amendment has a secular purpose; its primary effect does not
advance or inhibit religion; it does not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with reli-
gion. Id.
Appellees also argued that the Hyde amendment violated the guarantee of religious freedom in
the first amendment's free exercise clause. They argued that a woman's decision to seek a medi-
cally necessary abortion may be a product of her religious beliefs. The Court did not reach the
merits of this issue because it found that none of the appellees had standing to raise the challenge.
Id. The class of indigent women did not have standing because none alleged or proved that she
was compelled by religious beliefs to seek an abortion. Id. at 2690 (citing McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)). The two Board officers did not have standing because they lacked a
personal stake in the controversy; they failed to allege that they were or expected to be pregnant or
eligible for Medicaid. Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)). The Women's
Division did not have standing because of the requirements that must be met before an organiza-
tion can assert the rights of its members. The Court found that a free exercise challenge necessi-
tated a showing of how the statute coercively affects a person in the practice of religion. Id. (citing
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963)). Because an organizaton cannot
assert the rights of its membership if the claim or requested relief requires the participation of
individual members, the Women's Division could not meet the standing requirements. Id. (citing
Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
The hospital association did not attack the Hyde amendment on the basis of the free exercise
clause. Id. at 2690 n.22. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1544-72 (9th ed. 1975).
75. 100 S. Ct. at 2689.
76. Id. at 2687 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)).
77. Id. at 2688 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972)).
78. Id. (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)).
79. Id See notes 105-06 infra.
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tee the availability of funds to effectuate a constitutionally-protected
choice.80
The majority summarily disposed of the equal protection objections
to the Hyde amendment."' The Hyde amendment does not impinge
upon a fundamental right.82 Although the impact of the Hyde amend-
ment falls primarily on indigent persons,83 the legislative purpose only
need satisfy a rationality test because poverty alone is not a suspect
class. 4 The protection of the potentiality of human life is a legitimate
legislative purpose and the Hyde amendment rationally serves that le-
gitimate purpose. Furthermore, abortion is rationally distinguishable
from other medical services because no other medical procedure pur-
posely terminates a potential life.8 5  Thus, the majority stated that
funding choices are most appropriately made by legislatures rather
than by the judiciary.86
Justice White, in concurrence, 7 maintained that the Court's decision
in Maher v. Roe 8 precluded 9 the dissent's balance90 between a wo-
man's fundamental right and the state's policy choice.
80. 100 S. Ct. at 2688-89 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977)). See notes 62-71
supra and accompanying text. Arguably, the Court based its decision on judicial deference to
Congress' constitutionally-granted spending power. See 100 S. Ct. at 2689; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 1. That deference may be misplaced, however, in situations in which Congress uses the spend-
ing power to undermine a state's ability to protect its citizens, e.g., by withdrawing funding so that
a state is unable to fund its programs. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 314-16 (1978).
See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
81. 100 S. Ct. at 2690-93.
82. Id. at 2691.
83. See notes 104-06 infra and accompanying text.
84. 100 S. Ct. at 2691 (citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)). James involved a
California statute that required referendum approval for any low rent public housing project. The
challengers to the statute claimed that the statute adversely affected poor persons. The Court said
"a lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a particular group does not always deny equal pro-
tection." 402 U.S. at 142.
85. 100 S. Ct. at 2692.
86. Id. at 2693. When Congress makes a policy choice regarding funding, it acts under the
constitutional authority granted by the spending power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Although
congressional authority to spend is limited to spending for the general welfare, this authority is
virtually without limit. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrtrrIONAL LAW 247-50 (1978).
87. 100 S. Ct. at 2693 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's concurrence provided the
necessary fifth vote for the majority opinion. The basis for his concurrence thus takes on added
significance.
88. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See generally notes 56-65 supra and accompanying text.
89. 100 S. Ct. at 2694.
90. See notes 91-99 infra and accompanying text.
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In a dissenting opinion, 9' Justice Brennan emphasized the coercive
effect of funding restrictions on an indigent woman's decision to
abort.92 Justice Brennan began with the premise that an indigent wo-
man lacks the ability to pay for either a pregnancy or an abortion.93 By
funding pregnancies and not abortions, the government takes the deci-
sion of whether to abort or have a child out of the woman's hands. The
governmental policy favoring childbirth thus can discourage the exer-
cise of the fundamental right to choose to abort as effectively as would
criminal sanctions against the exercise of that right.94 This inhibition
of a constitutionally-protected choice is unconstitutional 95 as a limita-
tion on the use of governmental power to burden a woman's freedom
of choice.96
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissenting opinion, focused on the po-
91. 100 S. Ct. at 2702 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan wrote this opinion in dissent
to the Court's decisions in Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980) and Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S.
Ct. 2694 (1980). The Wrlliams case involved a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) to enjoin
enforcement of a state statute that prohibited state Medicaid payments for all abortions except
those necessary to save the life of the woman seeking the abortion. The Court found the opinion
in Harris dispositive. 100 S. Ct. at 2701.
Justices Blackmun and Marshall joined Justice Brennan's dissent. Both Justices also wrote dis-
sents of their own. Id. at 2711 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Id. at 2706 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall's dissent reiterated his dissatisfaction with the Court's rigid equal protection
analysis. Id. at 2708 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He argued that the level of scrutiny for legislation
exclusively affecting indigent women should be greater than that scrutiny afforded legislation con-
cerning economic interests. Traditional strict scrutiny is unavailable to protect an indigent
woman's interest because the Court refuses to define wealth as a suspect classification. Justice
Marshall thus believes a new analysis is needed.
Justice Marshall's analysis would assess the classification in Harris, a distinction between medi-
cally necessary abortions and other medically necessary services, by weighing "the importance of
the governmental benefits denied, the character of the class, and the asserted state interests." Id.
at 2709 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting his own dissent in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 458
(1977)). This analysis would hold the Hyde amendment unconstitutional. First, the governmental
benefits at issue are of absolutely vital importance to the welfare of the recipients. Second, the
burden of the amendment falls exclusively on a discrete and insular minority and the "devastating
impact" of the amendment makes the class affected entitled to special consideration. Third, be-
cause the governmental interest in normal childbirth may not be effectuated if the abortion is a
medical necessity and because the Hyde amendment's real purpose--to deprive poor women of
the right to choose an abortion-is constitutionally impermissible, the governmental interests can-
not outweigh the "brutal effect on indigent women." Id. at 2709 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
also note 26 supra.
92. 100 S. Ct. at 2703, 2704 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 2704 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2705 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 2702-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See note 76 supra and accompanying text. But
see note I ll infra and accompanying text.
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tentialy life-endangering consequences of denying funding to indigent
women for abortions. He interpreted the Roe doctrine97 as a limitation
on a state's protection of the potentiality of life when that interest con-
flicts with the health interests of a pregnant woman.98 The Hyde
amendment's disregard for the medical necessity of abortion thus
proves its unconstitutionality.99
The Harris opinion failed to address the proper scope of constitu-
tional protection for the right to decide to abort. The crux of the ma-
jority's opinion is its premise that a funding decision cannot impinge on
the fundamental right to decide to abort. 1°° The "no impingement"
finding ingores the blatant consequences of presenting an indigent wo-
man with a choice between a free pregnancy and a costly abortion. An
indigent woman will choose the free alternative because she lacks the
financial means to effectuate a decision to abort.10'
Justice Brennan's argument that a governmental funding choice that
encourages pregnancy can be an effective denial of the ability to decide
to abort is correct. 102 The decision to abort is a fundamental constitu-
tionaly-protected right. Therefore, the effective denial of the exercise
of the right is an "impingement" that subjects the statute to close scru-
tiny. The governmental interest in enacting the Hyde amendment was
to protect the potentiality of life. Under Roe v. Wade that governmen-
tal interest becomes compelling only at viability. 10 3 Because the Hyde
amendment denies federal funds for most abortions before viability, it
97. See notes 39-55 supra and accompanying text.
98. 100 S. Ct. at 2713 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2716 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. See notes 75-80 supra and accompanying text.
101. The source of the destructive effect on a woman's decision is a point of contention be-
tween the majority and the Brennan dissent. The majority recognized the possibility that a wo-
man's decision to abort in fact may be impossible. Id. at 2687. The cause of such an effect is the
woman's indigency, however, and not the legislation. Thus there is no impingement.
In contrast, Justice Brennan focused on the practical effect of lack of funding on a woman's
decision. In his view, the Hyde amendment was designed to, and does in fact, inhibit a woman's
freedom to choose abortion over childbirth. Id. at 2703 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 91-96
supra and accompanying text.
Thus it appears that the disagreement between the majority and the dissent is greater than
simply the source of the effect. The majority looked first to the governmental "action" and deter-
mined that there was "no action." Justice Brennan focused on the already recognized fundamen-
tal right to determine if it had been impinged.
102. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
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does not withstand close scrutiny and, therefore, is unconstitutional. 104
The Court held that Maher v. Roe controlled whether a funding pol-
icy decision constituted an "impingement."' 5 Harris, however, is fac-
tually distinguishable from Maher. In Harris the Hyde amendment
disallowed funding for most abortions, regardless of the medical neces-
sity.'0 6 In Maher the state statute only denied funding for elective first
trimester abortions and had no effect on funding for medically neces-
sary abortions. 107
The Court failed to address adequately whether a funding policy
may impinge on a fundamental interest magnified by medical neces-
sity.'08 Given the Court's past concern with the medical aspects of the
right to choose an abortion, 9 its disregard for medical necessity in
Harris is confusing. The Court's failure to avow its past concern for a
woman's health dissipates its seemingly definitive support for the legis-
lative prerogative to make funding choices.
By disregarding a woman's health interest in an abortion decision,
the Court implicitly limited the importance of the health interest in the
decision to abort."' The majority also shifted the focus of "impinge-
ment on the fundamental right" analysis to the nature of the govern-
mental action."' The present Court remains divided over the scope of
constitutional protection provided by the Court for a woman's right to
decide to terminate a pregnancy." 2 Until the Court provides a defini-
tive answer to this issue, lower courts are free to allow as little or as
much interference with that right as each deems proper.
104. 100 S. Ct. at 2713 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 2687-89. See note 68 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 56-65 supra and
accompanying text.
106. 100 S. Ct. at 2680-81. See note 4supra.
107. 432 U.S. at 466, 480. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
108. The majority briefly acknowledged and dismissed the medical necessity issue at two
points in the opinion. 100 S. Ct. at 2688, 2690-91. The opinion regards the relevance of the
medical necessity distinction as limited to the issue of whether the classification is suspect. But see
id. at 2707-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting); note 93 supra.
Justice Steven's dissent focused on the importance of the medical need in defining the funda-
mental right to be protected. 100 S. Ct. at 2713 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See notes 97-99 supra
and accompanying text.
109. See notes 45-46, 51 supra and accompanying text.
110. See notes 45, 46, 51, 67-68, 97-99 supra and accompanying text.
Ill. See notes 38, 41, 44-49, 58-65, 76, 78, 80 supra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 30, 91, 108 supra and accompanying text.
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